

25X1

Page Denied

25X1

~~SECRET~~

25 April 1960

230. The New Soviet Man

An important feature of the current program of the Soviet regime is the development of a "Communist man" to build the new "Communist society". According to Kommunist, "Ideological work must develop new qualities in the Soviet people, educating them in the spirit of collectivism and industriousness, socialist internationalism and patriotism, Communist morality and implacability toward all sorts of reactionary ideas and mores. . . . The all-round development of personality includes the development of man first as a worker, second as a consumer, third as a citizen and public figure and fourth as a moral and cultured personality." These traits of character are by no means new to Marxist doctrine, but they have now acquired a new significance and immediacy. The ambitious program set by the 21st Congress of the CPSU in January, 1959 requires, for its fulfillment, the continuing docility, sacrifice and industry of the Soviet people. Since it is apparently no longer feasible to employ the traditional Stalinist techniques of mass coercion (or, at least to the same degree), the regime is now emphasizing the creation of a "Communist man" who will voluntarily regulate his activities in accordance with the necessities of a society which is "building communism" and willingly limit the material rewards received for his labor. The techniques of control become more refined. As socialism grows into communism, "public self-government, persuasion and education of the masses become increasingly the main method of regulation of the life and activity of the Soviet society." Organs of "public self-government" such as the "comrades' courts" and the volunteer militia brigades are already assuming more and more responsibility for dealing with "anti-social" behavior -- a responsibility which includes not only the detection and condemnation of the offense, and decision as to the appropriate punishment, but assistance in the re-education and rehabilitation of the malefactor as well. Thus, the regime will rely increasingly on the fear of public embarrassment and censure to ensure social conformity. Basically, Khrushchev wishes to apply these techniques to reorient a society which has become indifferent to Communist goals and within which opportunism, skepticism and political apathy are increasing. Actually, however, if he is to realize his ambitious goals, Khrushchev will probably be forced to depend more and more on material incentives. Since experience during the Khrushchev era has shown that the incentive system tends to foster, rather than discourage, self-interest, opportunism and the stratification of classes, a dilemma of major proportions emerges for the Soviet leadership.

25X1

~~SECRET~~

Page Denied

~~SECRET~~

25 April 1960

231. Linguicide in China

On 10 February the New China News Agency reported the adoption by the Sinkiang People's Council of a new alphabet for the Turkic languages of the Uighur and Kazakh minorities. The decision to replace the previously used Arabic script with a new alphabet, consisting of 26 Latin letters plus 8 others based on sounds peculiar to the Uighur and Kazakh languages, fits in well with Chicom plans. The new alphabet is based on the Han (Chinese) language phoneticization plan, first adopted for larger Chinese groups to supersede the old, cumbersome Chinese ideographs with romanized letters. However, at least as far as the Uighurs and Kazakhs are concerned, the fact that more factors than simplification and unification are involved in the proposed reform was manifested in December 1959 in a speech by Saifuddin, Chairman of the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region and Secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee for that region. Saifuddin stressed the need for enriching the Uighur and Kazakh vocabularies by the adoption of Han words in order that, for example, the difficulties standing in the way of the adoption of new "technical terms" could be overcome. The experience gained in Sinkiang would, he pointed out, facilitate similar "reforms" for other minorities. An ulterior purpose behind this reform was suggested, however, by the Sinkiang Daily on 17 December 1959: "There is a section of the people in the country who are opposed to the use of the Han language phoneticization plan as the common basis for the reform of the languages of the minority nationalities on the ground that they are against assimilation. This is a reflection of bourgeois nationalism.... With the rapid development of socialist construction and the increasing frequency of intercourse between the nationalities it is natural that an increasing amount of Han words will find their way into the language of the minorities, and this is a natural trend of development which no force can stop.... Therefore, it is reactionary to oppose that process of natural union on the pretext of opposition to the assimilation of minority nationalities."

25X1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

25 April 1960

232. Everest

At a press conference in Kathmandu, the Nepalese capital, on 4 April, Nepalese Prime Minister B. P. Koirala revealed that during the two-week visit to Communist China from which he had just returned, the Chinese had laid claim to Mount Everest, but that Nepal had "not entertained" this claim. While in Peking, Koirala had signed two agreements: one called for demarcation of the 500-mile border between Nepal and Chicom-dominated Tibet; the other provided for a Chicom economic aid grant of \$21,000,000 to supplement a grant of \$12,600,000 given in 1956. Koirala postponed consideration of a Chicom offer to sign a treaty of peace and friendship until the return visit to Kathmandu of Chinese Premier Chou En-lai. Chou was expected in Kathmandu on 26 April after a visit to India, and it appeared likely that the Everest issue would also be discussed further at that time. The Indian press, meanwhile, has expressed great alarm at the news of the Chinese claim. The Hindustan Times of 6 April wrote: "How the Chinese appetite grows with what it feeds on...." On the same date the Indian Express said: "Here is another Chinese jigsaw puzzle in the making.... What is a mountain crest between friends pledged by panch shila to the bliss of peaceful coexistence?" The day before, The Statesman had said: "The height, identity, and much else about Everest have been argued over in the past, but this is the first time that the Chinese are known to have taken such a lively interest in the subject. It is unlikely that they do so now purely for love of mountaineering." The Hindu of Madras asks where China's territorial claims will end. In Ceylon?

25X1

~~SECRET~~

25 April 1960

233. Guinea: Red Beachhead in Black Africa

Concentration on Guinea by the Sino-Soviet bloc has now reached such proportions as to leave no doubt that Moscow plans to establish Guinea as a major base for Communist operations in Africa. The Bloc now has six embassies in Conakry (USSR, Communist China, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, and North Vietnam), and the new Soviet Ambassador (since January, 1960) is no less a personage than Daniel S. Solod, a top Soviet Near East expert and former ambassador to Cairo. Trade missions from these and other Communist countries wield heavy influence over Guinea's foreign commerce which is now more than 60% in Bloc hands, and which is placing Guinea increasingly in debt to the Bloc. Guinea's only foreign aid comes from the Bloc, both in the form of long-term commercial credits and a 140,000,000-ruble cash credit awarded by the USSR in late 1959. More than 100 Bloc advisers and technicians are involved in such widespread activities as airport construction of printing plants, customs enforcement, and postal operations. Guinea's currency is now being printed in Prague. Some Czech experts in Guinea are building a \$25 million radio transmitter of 150kw output--capable of reaching any point in Africa. Others are training the Guinean army in the use of small arms. (There are also unconfirmed reports that a group of Guinean army officers will soon receive training in both Prague and Moscow.) Six "sports experts" from Hungary have trained officials of Guinea's National Youth Organization. Some 400 rice cultivators from Communist China were expected to arrive in April to demonstrate "big leap" agricultural techniques. Such Bloc activities have been far from unwelcome to Sekou Toure, President of Guinea, and his Guinean Democratic Party (GDP) government, since he and many of his top lieutenants are Marxist trained and oriented and anticipate an eventual nationalization of the country's economic life and collectivization of its agriculture. There has been some evidence of late, however, that Toure does not regard Bloc predominancy in his country as an unmixed blessing, presumably because it poses an affront to his attempts to steer a neutralist course in foreign affairs. One indication of Toure's desire to assert autonomy came early this year when the Guinea Government hospitably received a Chinese Nationalist economic mission. Toure's irritation exploded most recently at the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Conakry on 12 April, when he delivered a rebuke, obviously directly toward the Bloc, at those who saw in Africa "a possibility of transforming our nations into territories reserved to their sole influence." How effective such impulses toward independence will be as Guinea develops more and more of a technical and economic dependence on the Bloc remains to be seen. Moscow is apparently geared to contain such tendencies, however, and has made no secret of the role it wishes Guinea to play. The World Marxist Review for December, 1959 termed Guinea's experience as "certainly of great value for Africa," and stated that Guinea's "success on the economic and political fronts" is "having an impact on the movement of the people of Black Africa as a whole... a tremendous influence on African minds." The same journal in January, 1960 highlighted Moscow's plans for Guinea by giving attention to Toure's "statement" that "his country regarded itself as an agent in speeding the complete liberation of the people of Africa." (FYI only: Sensitive information from the US Embassy

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

233. (Continued)

in Moscow in early March revealed that a CPSU lecturer had told an elite Moscow audience that Toure was the "only Asian or African nationalist leader deserving unqualified praise" and was an honest and vigorous Marxist"; and that the GDP, "while not Communist, " was "a good party with good perspectives." Khrushchev has now announced that he will visit Guinea in the fall, while Toure has accepted a recent Chicom invitation to visit Peking at an unspecified date.

25X1

t

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

25 April 1960

234. Hungarian Amn-ty

On 31 March 1960, for the 15th anniversary of Hungary's "liberation", a partial amnesty was granted to political and other prisoners. Included with several meaningless categories, were persons sentenced to terms of not more than six years for anti-state crimes committed before 1957. At the same time, detention on grounds of "crimes against the state" was abolished and by 30 June 1960 the state security camps are to be dissolved. The announcement specifically mentioned a number of prominent Hungarians who were being amnestied. These individuals fall into three distinct categories: intellectuals who had been incarcerated for supporting Imre Nagy, politicians sentenced for participation in the Nagy government, and hard-line Stalinists who had been jailed in 1956 for crimes committed during the Rakosi era. While the new amnesty involves a greater number of persons than were affected by the first one in April 1959, it is far short of being a general pardon of "counter-revolutionaries". Whatever the immediate causes of the amnesty and the degree of Soviet inspiration, it is apparent that its purpose is to improve the standing of the regime vis-a-vis world opinion and to counteract the adverse propaganda which has encumbered the Kadar regime since its inception. The decree also evidences the regime's efforts to depict a "return to normalcy" both internally and in relations with foreign powers. Undoubtedly, this conciliatory gesture will make it increasingly difficult for the West to focus world attention on the 1956 Revolution and its brutal suppression. Nevertheless, as Kadar becomes less useful as a target for straight anti-Communist propaganda he may become increasingly useful (particularly for revisionist media) as the Hungarian representative of the so-called "moderate" course, initiated by Khrushchev in the Soviet Union and still bitterly opposed by such inveterate Stalinists as Novotny, Ulbricht, and the Albanian leadership in toto.

25X1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

25X1

NUMBER 38

25 April 1960

Item #232: Bi-Weekly Guidance No. 29, item #180,
"Chinese Threat to Nepal", dated 21 December
1959.

Item #234:

ISTVAN BIBO, former Minister of State in Imre Nagy's cabinet, who after the crushing of the Revolution, expounded the theory of a political "third road" of Hungary; according to Western sources he is serving a life term, no official information was ever given on his trial.

SANDOR KOPACSI, Commander-in-Chief of the Budapest police during the 1956 Revolution who was sentenced to a life term with Imre Nagy and his group in June 1958.

GABOR TANCZOS, former Secretary of the Petofy Club, sentenced to 15 years, according to Western sources.

GYORGY FAZEKAS, a journalist and supporter of Imre Nagy, Sandor Kopacsi's cousin, sentenced to 10-11 years, according to Western sources.

Journalists GYULA OBERSOVSZKY and SANDOR GALI, sentenced to life and 15 years of imprisonment respectively, and journalist PAL LOECSEI, sentenced to eight years, again according to official sources.

CROSS-INDEXING

- 230. The New Soviet Man - E.
- 231. Linguicide in China - A.
- 232. Everest - A, F.
- 233. Guinea: Red Beachhead in Black Africa - A, E, G, I, P, U.
- 234. Hungarian Amnesty - C, N.

~~SECRET~~